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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LINDA G. KANGAS, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
RALPH C. KANGAS, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
Case No. 940633-CA 
Priority No. 15 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(i) (1994) (appeals from district court involving 
domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, 
annulment, property division, child custody, support, visitation, 
adoption, and paternity). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
WHETHER THE AWARD OF ALIMONY, IN THIS CASE, IS 
EXCESSIVE DUE TO THE FACT THAT APPELLEE IS ABLE TO ENJOY A HIGHER 
STANDARD OF LIVING THAN THE APPELLANT? 
This matter was preserved for appeal based upon the 
presentation of evidence presented and the closing argument of 
counsel. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The trial court judge abused his discretion in his 
establishment of unjust alimony award. 
Where a trial court may exercise broad discretion, 
we presume the correctness of the court's decision 
absent "manifest injustice or inequity that 
indicates a clear abuse of discretion. 
Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d at 819-820 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 
(quoting Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6,8 (Utah 1982). 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.5 (1994). 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.7 (1994). 
Art. I, § 1, Utah State Constitution. 
Art. I, § 7, Utah State Constitution. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the case: 
This case arises from a divorce trial. 
II. Course of proceedings: 
This case went through several pretrial hearings,none 
of which are at issue in this appeal, the case was finally tried 
to the court on June 9, 1994. 
Ill• Disposition in trial court: 
The plaintiff below was granted a Decree of Divorce. 
IV. Statement of facts: 
The parties herein were married on October 11, 
1969 (TT p. 28). They have two minor children who remain at 
home. (TT p. 29). In the Decree of Divorce the appellee was 
awarded the marital residence. (see paragraph 10 of the Decree 
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of Divorce, hereinafter DD para. 10). The appellee was also 
awarded alimony in the amount of $700.00 per month (DD para. 13). 
The court found that appellee had the ability to earn $1300.00 
per month. (see Findings of Fact paragraph 6, hereinafter FOF 
para. 6) The court further found that appellant had the ability 
to earn $3,300.00 per month. (FOF para. 20). The Court further 
found appellee's monthly expenses to be $2,400.00 per month. (FOF 
para.21). The court found the appellant's monthly expenses were 
$1,700.00 (FOF para. 21). 
The appellee claimed expenses of $2,886.90 per month 
(TT p. 55 and 128). The appellant claimed monthly expenses of 
$2,220 (TT p. 252). The trial found that appellee's monthly 
expense were a little high based upon the fact that some "may not 
be appropriate for these calculations and some others may be 
slightly high." (TT p. 295). 
Appellee submitted exhibit 5 which was a list of her 
expenses (TT p. 55). In exhibit 5 appellee claims that she is 
paying "Donations and Contributions" in the amount of $242.00* 
Appellee indicates that this amount is actually for what she 
referred to as a "ten percent tithe on my income, and a fast 
offering. I believe thaf's probably $80.00 for scouts." (TT p. 
49). Appellee requests the trial court to award her $140.00 per 
month as and for auto repairs and expenses. (TT p. 44). She 
further wants automobile payments. (TT p. 47). Appellee wants a 
budget for gifts in the amount of $20.00 per month. (TT p. 49-
50). These expenses appear to arbitrary and to a degree intended 
to be used for the sole purpose of inflating appellee's budget 
for the purpose of being awarded alimony. Appellee appears to be 
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taking the position that she is entitled to maintain the customs 
and traditions she had while married to appellant. (see TT p. 49 
and 50) Here she attempts to show that the payment of "tithing" 
was traditional in the marriage and then to show that the giving 
of gifts was traditional. This is a burden she chooses to have 
Mr. Kangas absorb for her by paying an increased alimony. She 
further testified that the amount of money she was claiming to 
need was based upon the life style that was enjoyed during the 
marriage and when said life style consisted of both parties 
incomes. (TT p. 54) She went on to say that her budget was a 
little high, because of the household maintenance. (TT p. 54). 
She then attempts to make her own financial situation appear to 
worse than it was by deducting from her income $229.45 per month 
for child support (TT p. 56). She would claim all of the 
expenses associated with raising the children to justify child 
support and alimony (Trial Exhibit 5). And ask for more money by 
deducting out said support. Appellee would not even want to 
include appellant's child support payments in her budget> 
Appellant, as a result of the break down of the marital 
relationship and this action, moved from the marital residence. 
(TT p. 202) He had one of his minor children, April, living with 
him. (TT p. 241). Appellant testified that he thought it would 
be appropriate to sell the house to pay off debts and free up 
substantial income (TT p. 226). Appellant testified that he 
lived in a small house, and that if he had the chance he would 
like to live in a home comparable with the marital residence of 
the parties (TT p. 247). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
At the time of trial the trial judge awarded the 
plaintiff/appellee alimony in the amount of $700.00. It is clear 
from the testimony of the parties that this was a clear abuse of 
discretion by the trial judge. The parties testified that they 
had been married for 24 years. (Trial Transcript Page 28, 
hereinafter TT p. 28). They further testified that they had 
owned the marital residence for a period of 14 years (TT p. 61-
2). There was testimony about the actual money spent for living 
expenses by the appellee (TT p. 151-154). This amount was 
substantially less than what the trial judge found to be 
reasonable living expenses. The appellant lost a substantial 
portion of his standard of living after the parties separated. 
The trial court appeared to be more concerned about the wife's 
standard of living and not nearly so concerned about the husbands 
standard of living. There appeared to be no attempt to equalize 
the parties post divorce standard of living. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
WHETHER THE AWARD OF ALIMONY, IN THIS CASE, IS EXCESSIVE 
DOE TO THE FACT THAT APPELLEE IS ABLE TO ENJOY A HIGHER 
STANDARD OF LIVING THAN THE APPELLANT? 
In this case the trial judge awarded the appellee an 
award of alimony in the amount of $700.00 per month. This was a 
clear abuse of authority. The standard of review to be applied 
in this case is whether or not the trial judge abused his 
discretion and the trial court's decision will not be disturbed 
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unless such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a 
clear abuse of discretion. English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 410 
(Utah 1977); Crockett v. Crockett, supra. 
The parties herein were married on October 11, 1969 (TT 
p. 28). They have two minor children who remain at home. (TT p. 
29). In the Decree of Divorce the appellee was awarded the 
marital residence. (see paragraph 10 of the Decree of Divorce, 
hereinafter DD para. 10). The appellee was also awarded alimony 
in the amount of $700.00 per month (DD para. 13). The award of 
alimony must be based upon a sound analyses by the trial court as 
set out in Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1074 (Utah 1985). This 
analyses must follow the following steps: 
[1] the financial conditions and needs of the 
wife; 
[2] the ability of the wife to produce a 
sufficient income for herself; and 
[3] the ability of the husband to provide support. 
Id. 
In this case the court found that appellee had the 
ability to earn $1300.00 per month. (see Findings of Fact 
paragraph 6, hereinafter FOF para. 6) The court further found 
that appellant had the ability to earn $3,300.00 per month. (FOF 
para. 20). The Court further found appellee's monthly expenses 
to be $2,400.00 per month. (FOF para.21). The court found the 
appellant's monthly expenses were $1,700.00 (FOF para. 21). 
The appellee claimed expenses of $2,886.90 per month 
(TT p. 55 and 128). The appellant claimed monthly expenses of 
$2,220 (TT p. 252). The trial found that appellee's monthly 
expense were a little high based upon the fact that some "may not 
be appropriate for these calculations and some others may be 
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slightly high." (TT p. 295). 
Appellee submitted exhibit 5 which was a list of her 
expenses (TT p. 55). In exhibit 5 appellee claims that she is 
paying "Donations and Contributions" in the amount of $242.00. 
Appellee indicates that this amount is actually for what she 
referred to as a "ten percent tithe on my income, and a fast 
offering. I believe that"s probably $80.00 for scouts." (TT p. 
49). Appellee requests the trial court to award her $140.00 per 
month as and for auto repairs and expenses. (TT p. 44). She 
further wants automobile payments. (TT p. 47). Appellee wants a 
budget for gifts in the amount of $20.00 per month. (TT p. 49-
50). These expenses appear to arbitrary and to a degree intended 
to be used for the sole purpose of inflating appellee's budget 
for the purpose of being awarded alimony. Appellee appears to be 
taking the position that she is entitled to maintain the customs 
and traditions she had while married to appellant. (see TT p. 49 
and 50) Here she attempts to show that the payment of "tithing" 
was traditional in the marriage and then to show that the giving 
of gifts was traditional. This is a burden she chooses to have 
Mr. Kangas absorb for her by paying an increased alimony. She 
further testified that the amount of money she was claiming to 
need was based upon the life style that was enjoyed during the 
marriage and when said life style consisted of both parties 
incomes. (TT p. 54) She went on to say that her budget was a 
little high, because of the household maintenance. (TT p, 54). 
She then attempts to make her own financial situation appear to 
worse than it was by deducting from her income $229.45 per month 
for child support (TT p. 56). She would claim all of the 
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expenses associated with raising the children to justify child 
support and alimony (Trial Exhibit 5), And ask for more money by 
deducting out said support* Appellee would not even want to 
include appellant's child support payments in her budget. 
Appellant, as a result of the break down of the marital 
relationship and this action, moved from the marital residence. 
(TT p. 202) He had one of his minor children, April, living with 
him. (TT p. 241). Appellant testified that he thought it would 
be appropriate to sell the house to pay off debts and free up 
substantial income (TT p. 226). Appellant testified that he 
lived in a small house, and that if he had the chance he would 
like to live in a home comparable with the marital residence of 
the parties (TT p. 247). 
This Court in Cox v. Cox, 877 P.2d 1269 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994) determined that some of the factors that go into the 
determination of an alimony award should be: 
[T]he amount and kind of property to be divided, 
the source of the property, the parties1 health, 
the parties1 standard of living and respective 
financial conditions, their needs and earning 
capacities, the duration of the marriage, what the 
parties gave up by the marriage, and the 
relationship the property division has with the 
amount of alimony awarded. 
Id. 
These factors are to be considered in connection with 
the Jones, supra factor previously enumerated. When a divorce 
occurs between a husband and a wife it is the duty of the Court 
to determine as nearly as possible what standard of living is 
possible and to equalize them as nearly as possible. This should 
occur as a part of the initial Jones analyses. 
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Jones enumerates three criteria to be used in 
determining the amount of an alimony award. Implied and inherent 
with in this analyses must be 1) the standard of living of the 
parties; and 2} the paying spouses monthly expenses. The Jones 
court enumerated three criteria they were: 
[1] the financial conditions and needs of the 
wife; 
[2] the ability of the wife to produce a 
sufficient income for herself; and 
[3] the ability of the husband to provide support. 
Id. 
Step number three must, of necessity, contain a two step 
breakdown similar to steps 1 and 2 in this analyses. They should 
be the financial conditions and needs of the husband and the 
ability of the husband to produce sufficient income for him self. 
This analyses should take place in the context of the 
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage and the ability of 
the parties joint income to maintain this same standard of living 
for each party, equally. In the event that this is not possible 
then the analysis should turn to what standard of living is 
appropriate for this broken marriage where the income used to 
sustain one home and one family must now sustain two homes and 
two families. 
This concept was closely stated in Howell V. Howell, 
806 P.2d 1209 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) when the court stated: 
We believe it is consistent with the goal of 
equalizing the parties1 post divorce status to 
look to the standard of living existing at or near 
the time of trial in determining alimony. This is 
consonant with the treatment of both marital 
property and child support and is better designed 
to equip both parties to go forward with their 
separate lives with relatively equal odds. It is 
further justified because any future changes in 
alimony are limited to instances where a material 
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change of circumstances has occurred. Bridenbauqh 
v. Bridenbaugh, 786 P.2d 241, 242 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). In so holding, we agree with the dissenting 
opinion that determining standard of living is a 
"fact-sensitive, subjective task." We disagree, 
however, that standard of living is determined by 
actual expenses alone. Those expenses may be 
necessarily lower than needed to maintain an 
appropriate standard of living for various 
reasons, including, possibly, lack of income. As 
Webster says, standard of living includes 
"customary or proper status" considering the 
parties1 circumstances. Those circumstances should 
be evaluated at the time of trial and, contrary to 
the dissent, can properly address what situation 
would have existed if the parties had not 
separated earlier. In this case, the 
post-separation substantial increase in 
plaintifffs income was akin to deferred income. In 
light of the facts of this case, we conclude that 
the trial court erred in looking at the 
pre-separation standard of living in setting 
alimony, but should have instead considered the 
standard of living "during the marriage" up to the 
time of trial. In so concluding we do not intend 
to establish a rigid rule which must be followed 
in all domestic cases, but acknowledge that trial 
courts have discretion to determine the standard 
of living which existed during the marriage after 
consideration of all relevant facts and equitable 
principles. In this case, it was inequitable and 
an abuse of discretion to pinpoint standard of 
living as of the time of the parties1 separation. 
Id. 
The court indicates that the time to determine the "standard of 
Living" is at the time of the trial in the divorce. The basis 
for this is because of the increases in plaintiff's income. 
However the court does not establish this as the rule, hard and 
fast* The critical point is that the Courts have the discretion 
to "determine the standard of living which existed during the 
marriage" The court further states that "We believe it is 
consistent with the goal of equalizing the parties1 post divorce 
status" and then it goes on to address how to arrive at this. 
The court recognized that some times a persons standard of living 
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is not measurable in monthly expenses, because: 
We disagree, however, that standard of living is 
determined by actual expenses alone. Those 
expenses may be necessarily lower than needed to 
maintain an appropriate standard of living for 
various reasons, including, possibly, lack of 
income. As Webster says, standard of living 
includes "customary or proper status" considering 
the parties1 circumstances. 
Id. 
Here the court clearly indicates that the standard of living of 
the parties prior to the divorce is relevant and not just the 
amount of monthly expenses. In Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116 
(Utah Ct. App 1990) the court stated this principle a little 
clearer when it indicated that sometimes there is just not enough 
income to go around to suit both parties needs: 
Here, the parties have approximately equal, if 
low, standards of living, which is not a 
substantial deviation from the "low, minimum" 
standard of living which the parties experienced 
during the marriage. "This is simply one of those 
all-too-frequent situations where the court was 
confronted with the impossible task of attempting 
to cut one blanket to cover two beds and satisfy 
both parties when the truth of the matter is that 
they cannot afford a divorce, but must have one 
anyway." Bader v. Bader, 18 Utah 2d 407, 424 P.2d 
150, 151 (1967). 
Id. 
From this it is critical to understand that it is inappropriate 
to cover one bed with an adequate blanket and leave the other bed 
inadequately covered. If warmth and comfort is to be afforded to 
one party then that same or comparable degree of warmth and 
comfort should be afforded the other party. Altogether too often 
the thought stops with the analysis of the first two points of 
Jones. That is to say many a court has taken the position that 
we need to take care of the wife and if the husband has to suffer 
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therefore so be it! 
What goes into a standard of living is varied and must 
be considered on a case by case basis. Some of the following 
should be considered in this case: 
WORK 
The appellee in this case works one job and this job is 
not far from her home. (TT p. 30). The appellant works at Hill 
Air Force Base and is on the road to go to work from two to two 
and one-half hours a day (TT p. 137, 242). During this time the 
appellant receives no extra compensation. The appellee indicated 
that she would refuse to get an extra job in order to assist 
herself after the divorce, she said "I could find a second job, 
but I wont because of the children". (TT p. 32 see also TT p. 
137). Mr. Kangas is already working two jobs and the appellee 
would suggest that he is capable of getting another job: 
Q. [By Mr. Jones] And does Mr. Kangas have the 
ability to earn more than he is now earning? 
A. He definitely has the ability to earn more, 
yes. 
Q. How is that? 
A. He has skills that he's developed while we 
were married. I think he can do many things. 
Q. Prior to working for Hill Air Force Base what 
did he do for a living? 
A. He's done many things. He owned his own 
paint contracting business in California. He's 
just done a varied number of things. 
Q„ If he had time after the Guard and Hill Air 
12 
Force Base, in your opinion could he do painting? 
A. Yes. And he could make a good living at it. 
TT p. 112; see also TT p. 137. 
Mrs. Kangas refuses to get a second job, but believes that it 
would be alright for Mr. Kangas to get a third jobl 
CHILDREN 
Mrs. Kangas was awarded the two remaining children and 
Mr. Kangas was awarded the custody of none of the children. 
While this is a factor not considered often in determining the 
standard of living, it is probably one of the most traumatic 
events in a divorce. This has the potential of being traumatic 
to all but the spouse awarded custody of the children. 
LIVING ARRANGEMENTS 
The marital residence was purchased by the parties 
about 14 years prior to the divorce (TT p. 61-62). The residence 
was refinanced two years prior to the divorce (TT p. 62). Mrs. 
Kangas requested that Mr. Kangas pay her $100.00 per month to fix 
up the home that the parties could not fix up during the 
marriage. (TT p. 67 and 104-106, and Exhibit 5). She has a big 
yard, and wants Mr.Kangas to weed and feed it and to pay for the 
care of the yard. (TT p. 43). 
On the other hand Mr. Kangas is to start out all over 
again, and this is after his credit is tied up in the house 
awarded to the appellee. Mr. Kangas1 standard of living drops. 
He no longer is able to claim the mortgage insurance as a tax 
deduction. (TT p. 240). M. Kangas does not have the ability to 
build an equity in real property. (TT p. 240). Mr Kangas is 
living in a much smaller home than when he was married. He is 
13 
now living in a one bathroom and two bedroom rented home. The 
home purchased and lived in during the marriage was a four 
bedroom spacious home. (TT p. 247). 
Clearly the post standard of living has not been 
equalized as between theses two parties. Mrs. Kangas has had to 
make little if any adjustments to her standard of living and Mr. 
Kangas has had to take a tremendous drop in his standard of 
living just to get by. 
MONTHLY EXPENSES 
Mrs. Kangas testified that her monthly needs were 
(based upon her budget) $2,886.90. The court found that her 
reasonable expenses were $2,400.00 without explaining the 
departure from her claim. The court found that Mr. Kangas1 
monthly expenses were $1,700.00 per month. 
In testimony there was clear evidence that Mrs. Kangas 
consistently got by on less than $2,400.00 per month. Exhibit 21 
showed that Mrs. Kangas had spent $2,030.56 (including $1,000.00 
for attorneyfs fees) In February 1993. In March of 1993 she 
spent $910.85. In April 1993 she spent $1,944.41. In May 1993 
she spent $1,745.44. In June 1993 she spent $2,056.64. In July 
1993 she spent $2,104.89. (See TT p. 151-154 and Exhibit 21). At 
no point does appellee's monthly expenses approach the level of 
what she claimed she would need on a monthly basis nor the amount 
the court found reasonable. Mrs. Kangas indicated that this was 
reflective of her average cost of living (TT p. 154). During 
this time period Mrs. Kangas continued to pay her tithing 
(contributions) the Mormon Church. (TT p. 49). Mrs. Kangas1 
actual cost of living was much less than she represented to the 
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court. Mrs. Kangas has sufficient money available to her to live 
in a reasonable fashion and still donate money each month to the 
church and scouts. Mrs. Kangas was in a position to borrow money 
and to go on a trip with the boys. She borrowed $1,000.00 she 
wasnft sure if she would need $500.00 or more but this was to go 
on a trip. Mrs. Kangas has been able to save about $200.00 in 
the period between January and August 1993 (TT p. 151-154). 
In contrast, Mr. Kangas has not been able to save any 
money. (TT p. 215). Mr. Kangas has not been able to pay tithing 
(contributions to the church) (TT p. 234). Mr. Kangas has no 
funds to buy clothing routinely (TT p. 236). Mr. Kangas has 
taken from his gross pay about $1,000.00 per month (TT p. 239). 
Mr. Kangas can not afford to go on any vacations (TT p. 249). 
During the marriage, Mr. Kangas used to participate in sport 
races, but now he does not have the money to pay the entry fees 
(TT p. 250). Mr. Kangas wished he had a washer and dryer, Mrs 
Kangas does (TT p. 250). 
OPINION OF STANDARD OF LIVING 
Mrs. Kangas does not feel that equality is a factor to 
be considered in this matter. She testified that: 
Q. [By Mr. Oliver] You would like to take 34 
[this is after she testified that the joint income 
of the parties was $49,000.00] and leave Ralph 
[Mr. Kangas] with 15, is that correct? 
A. That's the way it works out. That's what I 
need. 
Q. Uh-huh. Now, You think that it's appropriate 
that your standard of living be higher than Mr. 
15 
Kangas!s after the divorce? 
A. Umm, I believe hefs capable where I'm not. I 
have no other income, none. (See TT. p. 141-142). 
Mr. Kangas on the other hand testified to how nice it would be to 
be able to live so high on the hog, when he testified that: 
Q. [By Mr. Oliver] Are you living anywhere close 
to the standard of living you were living in prior 
to your separation from Linda [Mrs. Kangas]? 
A. No absolutely not. 
Q. Would you right now trade places with Linda, 
right even-Steven with the way things are, as far 
as standards of living goes? 
A. Absolutely, (see TT page 251). 
The post divorce standard of living of the parties should be 
proportionate. One party should not be given an inherently 
better standard of living than the other party. This court in 
Howell, supra stated: 
The alimony award, however, need not be large 
enough to maintain the receiving spouse at the 
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage if 
that amount of alimony would lower the standard of 
living of the paying spouse below that of the 
receiving spouse. Alimony may only raise the 
standard of living of the receiving spouse until 
it is roughly equal to that of the paying spouse. 
It is in this sense that alimony should seek "to 
the extent possible, [to] equalize the parties' 
respective post-divorce living standards." Rasband 
v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). 
In this case the inequities are obvious. In this case 
the trial court abused his discretion in the amount of alimony 
awarded to the appellee. This abuse of discretion is clear and 
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creates a substantial injustice and prejudice. Mr. Kangas should 
be able to enjoy the same post divorce standard of living as does 
Mrs. Kangas or there should be a re-evaluation of the alimony in 
this case. 
In the case of Bingham v, Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065 (Utah 
Ct App 1994) the court considered the issue of an alimony award 
which exceeded the receiving parties established need and ruled 
as follows: 
Where the trial court has offered no explanation 
for such a discrepancy, we agree with defendant 
that the court should not have awarded plaintiff 
more than her established needs required, 
regardless of defendant's ability to pay this 
excess amount. 
Id. 
That the amount of alimony awarded was in excess of appellee's 
monthly needs is evidenced by Exhibit 21. This is clearly an 
abuse of discretion and is clearly prejudicial to the appellant. 
CONCLUSION 
This case should be remanded back to the trial court 
with instructions that the court should equalize the post divorce 
standard of living of the parties, after the analyses is 
completed involving the Jones factors. This court should further 
expand the Jones factors so that a clear picture is established 
for the parties, the attorneys and the trial judge, so that 
equitable resolutions occur through proper application of the 
law. Dated this day of May, 1995. 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
78-2a-3 JUDICIAL CODE m 
a successor is appointed and qualified. The presiding 
judge of t he Court of Appeals shall receive as addi-
tional compensation $1,000 per a n n u m or fraction 
thereof for the period served. 
(2) The Cour t of Appeals shall sit and render judg-
ment in panels of three judges. Assignment to panels 
shall be by random rotat ion of all judges of the Court 
of Appeals. The Court of Appeals by rule shall pro-
vide for the selection of a chair for each panel . The 
Court of Appeals may not sit en banc. 
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a 
presiding judge from among the members of the court 
by majority vote of all judges. The t e rm of office of the 
presiding judge is two years and unt i l a successor is 
elected. A presiding judge of the Court of Appeals 
may serve in t h a t office no more t h a n two successive 
terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for 
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or 
incapacity of the presiding judge. 
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the 
office of presiding judge by majority vote of all judges 
of the Court of Appeals. In addition to the duties of a 
judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge 
shall: 
(a) adminis ter the rotat ion and scheduling of 
panels; 
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court; 
(c) call and preside over the meet ings of the 
Court of Appeals; and 
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme 
Court and the Judicial Council. 
(5) Fi l ing fees for the Court of Appeals are the 
same as for the Supreme Court. 1988 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue 
all extraordinary writs and to issue all wri ts and pro-
cess necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect i ts judgments , orders, 
and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resul t ing from 
formal adjudicative proceedings of s ta te agencies 
3 or appeals from the district court review of infor-
^ mal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, ex-
^ cept the Public Service Commission, S ta te Tax 
^* Commission, Board of S ta te Lands, Board of Oil, 
* Gas, and Mining, and the s ta te engineer; 
^ (b) appeals from the district court review of: 
Ov (i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of 
\ political subdivisions of the s ta te or other lo-
V ^ cal agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under 
Section 63-46a-12.1; 
. ^ (c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except 
those from the small claims depar tment of a cir-
cuit court; 
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of 
record in criminal cases, except those involving a 
charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal 
cases, except those involving a conviction of a 
first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from orders on petit ions for ex-
t raord inary wri ts sought by persons who are in-
carcerated or serving any other criminal sen-
tence, except petit ions const i tut ing a challenge to 
a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree 
or capital felony; 
•(h)- appeals from the orders on peti t ions for ex-
t raordinary wr i t s chal lenging the decisions of tlie 
Board of Pardons except in cases involving a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from district court involving domes-
tic relat ions cases, including, bu t not limited to 
divorce, annu lmen t , property division, child cus^ 
tody, support, visi tat ion, adoption, and paternity; 
(j) appeals from the U t a h Mili tary Court; and 
(k) cases t ransferred to the Court of Appeals 
from the Supreme Court . 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon i ts own motion-only 
and by the vote of four judges of the court may certify 
to the Supreme Court for original appellate review 
and determinat ion any m a t t e r over which the Court 
of Appeals has original appel late jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the re-
qui rements of Tit le 63, Chapte r 46b, in i ts review of 
agency adjudicative proceedings. 1992 
78-2a-4. R e v i e w of ac t ions b y S u p r e m e Court. 
Review of the judgments , orders, and decrees of the 
Court of Appeals shall be by petit ion for wri t of certi-
orari to the Supreme Court. 1986 
78-2a-5. Locat ion of Court of Appea l s . 
The Court of Appeals has i ts principal location in 
Salt Lake City. The Court of Appeals may perform 
any of its functions in any location within the state. 
1986 
CHAPTER 3 
DISTRICT COURTS 
Section 
78-3-1 to 78-3-2. Repealed. 
78-3-3. Term of judges — Vacancy. 
78-3-4. Jurisdiction — Transfer of cases to cir-
cuit court — Appeals — Jurisdiction 
when circuit and district court 
merged. 
78-3-5. Repealed. 
78-3-6. Terms — Minimum of once quarterly. 
78-3-7 to 78-3-11. Repealed. 
78-3-11.5. State District Court Administrative 
System. 
78-3-12. Repealed. 
78-3-12.5. Costs of system. 
78-3-13. Repealed. 
78-3-13.4. Counties joining court system — Pro-
cedure — Facilities — Salaries. 
78-3-13.5, 78-3-14. Repealed. 
78-3-14.5. Allocation of district court fees and 
fines. 
78-3-15 to 78-3-17. Repealed. 
78-3-17.5. Application of savings accruing to 
counties. 
78-3-18. Judicial Administration Act — Short 
title. 
78-3-19. Purpose of act. 
78-3-20. Definitions. 
78-3-21. Judicial Council — Creation — Mem-
bers — Terms and election — Re-
sponsibilities — Reports. 
78-3-21.5. Data bases for judicial boards. 
78-3-22. Presiding officer — Compensation — 
Duties. 
78-3-23. Administrator of the courts — Ap-
pointment — Qualifications — Sal-
ary. 
78-3-24. Court administrator — Powers, du-
ties, and responsibilities. 
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child support entered on or after Ju ly 1, 1989. 
(2) (a) The child support guidelines shall be ap-
plied as a rebuttable presumption in establishing 
or modifying the amount of temporary or perma-
nent child support. 
(b) The rebuttable presumption means the pro-
visions and considerations required by the guide-
lines and the award amounts result ing from the 
application of the guidelines are presumed to be 
correct, unless rebutted under the provisions of 
this section. 
(3) A written finding or specific finding on the 
record supporting the conclusion tha t complying with 
_a provision of the guidelines or ordering an award 
amount resulting from use of the guidelines would be 
unjust, inappropriate, or not in the best interest of a 
child in a particular case is sufficient to rebut the 
presumption in tha t case. 
(4) (a) Natural or adoptive children of either par-
ent who live in the home of tha t parent and are 
not children in common to both parties may at 
the option of either party be taken into account 
under the guidelines in setting or modifying a 
child support award, as provided in Subsection 
(5). 
(b) Additional worksheets shall be prepared 
tha t compute the obligations of the respective 
parents for the additional children. The obliga-
tions shall then be subtracted from the appropri-
ate parent 's income before determining the 
award in the instant case. 
(5) In a proceeding to modify an existing award, 
consideration of natural or adoptive children other 
than those in common to both parties may be applied 
to mitigate an increase in the award, but may not be 
applied to justify a decrease in the award. 
(6) With regard to child support orders, enactment 
of the guidelines and any subsequent change in the 
guidelines constitutes a substantial or material 
change of circumstances as a ground for modification 
of a court order, if there is a difference of at least 25% 
between the existing order and the guidelines. With 
regard to IV-D cases, the office may request modifica-
tion, in accordance with the requirements of the Fam-
ily Support Act of 1988, Public Law 100-485, no more 
often than once every three years. 1990 
78-45-7.3. Procedure — Documentat ion — Stip-
ulation. 
(1) In a default or uncontested proceeding, the 
moving party shall submit: 
(a) a completed child support worksheet; 
(b) the financial verification required by Sub-
section 78-45-7.5(5); and 
(c) a written statement indicating whether or 
not the amount of child support requested is con-
sistent with the guidelines. 
(2) (a) If the documentation of income required un-
der Subsection (1) is not available, a verified rep-
resentation of the defaulting party's income by 
the moving party, based on the best evidence 
available, may be submitted. 
(b) The evidence shall be in affidavit form and 
may only be offered after a copy has been pro-
vided to the defaulting party in accordance with 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or Title 63, Chap-
ter 46b, the Administrative Procedures Act, in an 
administrative proceeding. 
UJ a completed cnua support worksheet; 
(ii) the financial verification required by 
Subsection 78-45-7.5(5); and 
(iit) a written statement indicating 
whether or not the amount of child support 
requested is consistent with the guidelines. 
(b) A hearing is not required, but the guide-
lines shall be used to review the adequacy of a 
child support order negotiated by the parents. 
(c) A stipulated amount for child support or 
combined child support and alimony is adequate 
under the guidelines if the stipulated child sup-
port amount or combined amount exceeds the 
total child support award required by the guide-
lines. When t h e stipulated amount exceeds the 
guidelines, it irfay be awarded without a finding 
under Section 78-45-7.2. 1990 
78-45-7.4. Obligation — Adjusted g ross income 
used. 
Adjusted gross income shall be used in calculating 
each parent's share of the child support award. Only 
income of the natural or adoptive parents of the child 
may be used to determine the award under these 
guidelines. 1989 
78-45-7.5. Determination of g ross income — Im-
puted income. 
(1) As used in the guidelines "gross income" in-
cludes: 
(a) prospective income from any source, in-
cluding nonearned sources, except under Subsec-
tion (3); and 
(b) income from salaries, wages, commissions, 
royalties, bonuses, rents, gifts from anyone, 
prizes, dividends, severance pay, pensions, inter-
est, trust income, alimony from previous mar-
riages, annuities, capital gains, social security 
benefits, workers' compensation benefits, unem-
ployment-compensation, disability insurance 
benefits, and payments from "nonmeans-tested" 
government programs. 
(2) Income from earned income sources is limited 
to the equivalent of one full-time job. 
(3) Specifically excluded from gross income are: 
(a) Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC); 
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy 
program, the Job Training Partnership Act, 
S.S.I., Medicaid, Food Stamps, or General Assis-
tance; and 
(c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits 
received by a parent. 
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or oper-
ation of a business shall be calculated by 
subtracting necessary expenses required for self-
employment or business operation from gross re-
ceipts. The income and expenses from self-em-
ployment or operation of a business shall be re-
viewed to determine an appropriate level of gross 
income available to the parent to satisfy a child 
support award. Only those expenses necessary to 
allow the business to operate at a reasonable 
level may be deducted from gross receipts. 
(b) Gross income determined under this sub-
section may differ from the amount of business 
income determined for tax purposes. 
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be 
computed on an annual basis and then recalcu-
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lated to determine the average gross monthly in-
come. 
(b) Each parent shall provide suitable docu-
mentation of current earnings, including year-to-
date pay stubs or employer statements. Each par-
ent shall supplement documentation of current 
earnings with copies of tax returns from at least 
the most recent year to provide verification of 
earnings over time and shall document income 
from nonearned sources according to the source. 
Verification of income from records maintained 
by the Office of Employment Security may be 
substituted for employer statements and income 
tax returns. 
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be 
used to determine whether an underemployment 
or overemployment situation exists. 
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the 
parent under Subsection (7). 
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent un-
less the parent stipulates to the amount imputed 
or a hearing is held and a finding made that the 
parent is voluntarily unemployed or underem-
ployed. 
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the in-
come shall be based upon employment potential 
and probable earnings as derived from work his-
tory, occupation qualifications, and prevailing 
earnings for persons of similar backgrounds in 
the community. 
(c) If a parent has no recent work history, in-
come shall be imputed at least at the federal min-
imum wage for a 40-hour work week. To impute 
a greater income, the judge in a judicial proceed-
ing or the presiding officer in an administrative 
proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact as 
to the evidentiary basis for the imputation. 
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the 
following conditions exist: 
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for 
the parents' minor children approach or 
equal the amount of income the custodial 
parent can earn; 
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally dis-
abled to the extent he cannot earn minimum 
wage; 
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occu-
pational training to establish basic job skills; 
or 
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs 
of a child require the custodial parent 's pres-
ence in the home. 
(8) (a) Gross income may not include the earnings 
of a child who is the subject of a child support 
award, nor benefits to a child in the child's own 
right, such as Supplemental Security Income. 
(b) Social Security benefits received by a child 
due to the earnings of a parent may be credited 
as child support to the parent upon whose earn-
ing record it is based, by crediting the amount 
against the potential obligation of tha t parent. 
Other unearned income of a child may be consid-
ered as income to a parent depending upon the 
circumstances of each case. 1990 
78-45-7.6. Adjusted gross income. 
(1) As used in the guidelines, "adjusted gross in-
come" is the amount calculated by subtracting from 
gross income alimony previously ordered and paid 
and child support previously ordered. 
(2) The guidelines do not reduce the total child 
support award by adjusting the gross incomes of the 
parents for alimony ordered in the pending proceed-
ing. In establishing alimony, the court shall consider 
tha t in determining the child support, the guidelines 
do not provide a deduction from gross income for ali-
mony. 1989 
78-45-7.7. Calculation of obligations. 
(1) The parents' child support obligation shall be 
divided between them in proportion to their adjusted 
gross incomes. 
(2) Except in cases of joint physical custody and 
split custody as defined in Section 78-45-2, the total 
child support~award-shalUbedetermined as follows:. 
(a) Combine the adjusted gross incomes of the 
parents and determine the base combined child 
support obligation using the base child support 
obligation table. 
(b) Calculate each parent's proportionate 
share of the base combined child support obliga-
tion by multiplying the combined child support 
obligation by each parent's percentage of com-
bined adjusted gross .income, anil "subtracting 
from the products the children's portion of any 
monthly payments made directly by each parent 
for medical and dental insurance premiums. 
(c) Allocate monthly work-related child care 
costs equally to each parent. 
(d) Calculate the total child support award by 
adding the noncustodial parent's share of the 
base child support obligation calculated in Sub-
section (2)(b) and the amount allocated in Sub-
section (2)(c). Include in the order both amounts 
and the total child support award. 
(3) The base combined child support obligation ta-
ble provides combined child support obligations for up 
to ten children. For more than ten children, addi-
tional amounts shall be added to.the Jba.se child sup-
port obligation shown. The amount shown on the ta-
ble is the support amount for the total number of 
children, not an amount per child. 1990 
78-45-7.8. Split custody — Obligation calcula-
tions. 
In cases of split custody, the total child support 
award shall be determined as follows: 
(1) Combine the adjusted gross incomes of the 
parents and determine the base combined child 
support obligation using the base child support 
obligation table. Allocate a portion of the calcu-
lated amount between the parents in proportion 
to the number of children for whom each parent 
has physical custody. The amounts so calculated 
are a tentative base child support obligation due 
each parent from the other parent for support of 
the child or children for whom each parent has 
physical custody. 
(2) Multiply the tentative base child support 
obligation due each parent by the percentage 
that the other parent's adjusted gross income 
bears to the total combined adjusted gross income 
of both parents. 
(3) Subtract from the products in Subsection 
T2) the children's portion of any monthly pay-
ments made directly by each parent for medical 
and dental insurance premiums. 
(4) Subtract the lesser amount in Subsection 
(3) from the larger amount to determine the base 
child support award to be paid by the parent with 
the greater financial obligation. 
(5) Allocate combined monthly work-related 
child care costs equally to each parent. 
ARTICLE L DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 
Sec 1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.] 
AH men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and defend their 
lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect property; to worship according to 
the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and 
petition for redress of grievances; to communicate freely their thoughts and 
opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that right. 
1896 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
